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Understanding why large, complex human societies have emerged and persisted more readily
in certain regions of the world than others is an issue of long-standing debate. Here, we
systematically test different hypotheses involving the social and ecological factors that may
ultimately promote or inhibit the formation of large, complex human societies. We employ
spatially explicit statistical analyses using data on the geographical and temporal distribution
of the largest human groups over a 3000-year period of history. The results support the
predictions of two complementary hypotheses, indicating that large-scale societies developed
more commonly in regions where (i) agriculture has been practiced for longer (thus providing
more time for the norms and institutions that facilitate large-scale organisation to emerge),
and (ii) warfare was more intense (as proxied by distance from the Eurasian steppe), thus
creating a stronger selection pressure for societies to scale up. We found no support for the
influential idea that large-scale societies were more common in those regions naturally
endowed with a higher potential for productive agriculture. Our study highlights how modern
cultural evolutionary theory can be used to organise and synthesise alternative hypotheses
and shed light on the ways ecological and social processes have interacted to shape the
complex social world we live in today.
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The size and complexity of modern human societies is on ascale unmatched in other species. Yet for much of ourevolution humans lived in small-scale, internally undif-
ferentiated groups, and it is only in the last several thousand years
that larger-scale societies with more complex forms of organisa-
tion began to develop resulting in what we can label “macro-
states” or “empires” involving millions of individuals. Anecdotal
and empirical research indicates that historically the largest
human societies tended to be situated in a relatively narrow band
of the Afro-Eurasian landmass, stretching from Western and
Central Europe and the Mediterranean in the West, through to
China in the East (Fig. 1) (Diamond, 1997; Turchin et al., 2013).
Understanding how and why humans are able to form func-
tioning societies on such a scale, and why large, complex societies
have tended to form more readily in certain places are questions
of long-standing interest across a range of disciplines (Carneiro,
2003; Flannery and Marcus, 2012; Sanderson, 2015). The strong
geographic patterns noted above suggest that ecology may play an
important role yet a number of other factors have been proposed
to be important in driving the evolution of social complexity such
as the development and productivity of agriculture (Diamond,
1997; Nielsen, 2004), information processing (Morris, 2013),
warfare (Turchin et al., 2013), the geography of continental land
masses (Diamond, 1997), technology (Morris, 2013), and religion
(Norenzayan et al., 2014). However, there have been relatively few
empirical tests of these competing ideas within a common the-
oretical framework. Here, we employ modern cultural evolu-
tionary theory to systematically develop and empirically test a
range of alternative hypotheses involving the socio-ecological
factors that may ultimately promote or inhibit the formation of
large, complex human societies.
Deriving cultural evolutionary hypotheses. Cultural evolu-
tionary theory (CET) is a conceptual framework concerned with
understanding how and why socio-cultural traits emerge and
spread (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2015; Mesoudi,
2011). In CET cultural traits are seen to exhibit variation that is
inherited from one individual or group to another, and when
there is competition then selection and adaptation can occur;
mirroring the key processes of biological evolution (Futuyma,
2013). For groups to remain politically unified as they expand
their territory, either through the physical movement of people,
or the joining together or annexation of other groups, cultural
norms and institutions must be developed that structure social
interactions and enable social cohesion (Fukuyama, 2011; North,
1990; Turchin, 2016; Turchin et al., 2018). For example, estab-
lishment of formal leaders with the authority to punish free-riders
can solve collective action problems (Smith et al., 2015), while
more hierarchical organisation and specialised, bureaucratic
forms of political organisation can improve coordination over
larger distances (Carneiro, 1981; Spencer, 2010; Turchin and
Gavrilets, 2009). While a large number of processes may be
involved in the evolution of large-scale societies, our focus here is
on factors that have systematically affected the geographic and
temporal distribution of such groups. From a CET perspective,
the variation seen in the occurrence of large-scale societies, could
be due to differences in different parts of the world relating to (i)
the benefits and costs of large-scale organisation (selection), (ii)
the generation of different socio-cultural traits involved in large-
scale organisation (variation), (iii) the transmission of these traits
across time and space (inheritance). Here, we develop specific
hypotheses about the factors in the real-world relating to these
processes of selection, variation, and inheritance.
In humans, competition between groups is potentially a strong-
selective force. While warfare has probably occurred throughout
history, the intensity of between-group conflict has varied across
space and time. A major historically attested factor intensifying
warfare was the development of horse-based military technologies
such as chariots and cavalry (Turchin et al., 2013). These first
developed in the pastoralist societies of the Eurasian steppe and
enabled such groups to raid settled agricultural societies in
regions neighbouring the steppe, sometimes inflicting severe
casualties (Turchin, 2010). It is hypothesised that pressure from
the steppe selected for the unification and scaling-up of
agricultural societies into larger groups to more effectively
counteract these incursions. This in turn would select for greater
size in pastoralist communities, and also other neighbouring
agricultural groups who were now relatively smaller and at a
competitive disadvantage with their neighbours. This effect would
be amplified by the diffusion of such military technology from the
steppe. Under this hypothesis we would predict that there is
relationship between the occurrence of large-scale societies and
distance from the Eurasian steppe (relating to the presence of
intensive forms of horse-based warfare), with large-scale societies
occurring more frequently nearer the steppe (the “steppe warfare”
hypothesis).
A number of factors may affect the probability of developing
the kinds of norms and institutions that underpin larger scale
societies (i.e., the generation of variation may be greater in some
regions than others). While the rate of cultural evolution is
generally faster than biological evolution, the development of
social norms and institutions for collective action is not
straightforward and may require long periods of cultural
experimentation (Richerson and Boyd, 2001; Wright, 2006).
Furthermore, norms and institutions may need to accumulate
over generations and build on preceding innovations (Currie
et al., 2016; Flitton and Currie, 2018). Differences in the time that
has been available to societies to develop the institutions that
underpin stable large-scale organisation may therefore play an
important role in explaining the distribution of such societies.
Related to this, agriculture is often cited as being a necessary
condition for large, centralised societies as it enables societies to
develop and finance institutions of coordination and control
involving political specialists (leaders, bureaucrats, priests etc.)
who do not produce their own food but are supported by the rest
of the population due to the productive nature of the resource
base (Johnson and Earle, 2000; Mayshar et al., 2015). Both the
duration (Diamond, 1997; Morris, 2013) and productivity
(Johnson and Earle, 2000; Nielsen, 2004) of agriculture have
featured prominently in debates in the evolution of sociopolitical
complexity. For this paper we therefore predict that large-scale
societies would occur more in places where agriculture has been
practiced for longer (the “duration of agriculture” hypothesis), or
where the productivity of agriculture is higher (the “agricultural
productivity” hypothesis). For the second of these ideas we focus
on the hypothesis that some regions may have had more
favourable ecological conditions and examine potential agricul-
tural productivity (rather than achieved productivity), represent-
ing a kind of productivity endowment.
The above hypotheses capture the roles of selection and
variation (which is inherited and accumulated over time) in
potentially affecting the spatio-temporal distribution of large-
scale societies. However, these processes can also interact—in
order for selection to occur variation in cultural traits needs to be
generated. We therefore also assess whether the effect of selection
is stronger in regions that have had longer to develop some of the
norms and institutions that underpin larger-scale organization
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(i.e., we predict a positive interaction between proximity to the
steppe and duration of agriculture).
Finally, we also control for two factors in assessing support for
the above ideas. We assess whether more rugged regions are more
difficult to be conquered and brought under control by an outside
force (the “terrain ruggedness” hypothesis) (Scott, 2014). We also
control for the possibility that the spread of large-scale societies
and their norms and institutions was not due to any of the
processes outlined above but may simply have been contingent on
where the first such societies initially arose (the “first empires”
hypothesis)—warfare may have been more intense initially near
these regions, leading to scaling up of societies in neighbouring
regions, and/or technological or social innovations may have
diffused out from these regions.
In previous work (Turchin et al., 2013), we tested the logic and
plausibility of the “steppe warfare” hypothesis through developing
an agent-based model of this process, running the model in a
geographically explicit framework, and testing how well the
output from the simulation matched the observed historical
distribution of large-scale societies. However, this hypothesis was
not systematically tested against other plausible ideas, so it was
not possible to evaluate the importance of such a process in
shaping the evolution of human societies. Importantly, there are a
number of other processes that lead to similar spatial predictions
as the “steppe warfare” hypothesis. Here, we use the same
outcome variable as in our previous work (the extent to which
different parts of the world have been inhabited by large-scale
societies—see below), and assess the relative importance of
different predictors representing different hypotheses and derived
from newly collated data in a geographically explicit statistical
modelling framework.
Methods
Data. In order to test the predictions of these hypotheses we
statistically assess how well these factors explain real-world data
on the historical and geographical distribution of large-scale
societies. A spatial explicit dataset was created using Geographic
Information Systems. Data were organised in grid cells under an
equal-area projection so as to maintain a constant cell size of
10,000 km2 (~100 km by 100 km).
Dependent variable. We examine data on the spatial and tem-
poral distribution of large states and empires in Afro-Eurasia
from the period 1500 BCE–1500 CE (Turchin et al., 2013). Our
data consist of maps of the extent of politically unified states and
empires (“polities”) compiled from historical atlases and other
sources and sampled at 100-year intervals. Polygons of polities at
each time step were created and areas were calculated under an
equal-area projection. For the main analyses polygons
<100,000 km2 were not included in the final dataset (we explore
the effects changing this threshold to 80,000 and 120,000 km2 in
the SI). For each time step we assessed whether a grid cell was
occupied by a polity meeting the size threshold. Data from dif-
ferent time slices are combined to assess how frequently different
cells have been occupied by polities over the entire 3000 year
time-span to create our main dependent variable—“imperial
density” (Fig. 1). To focus our analyses on regions in which
agriculture was the main form of subsistence, analyses were
conducted using cells in which agriculture was practiced by 1500
CE, and cells in which agricultural production was at least
potentially possible (i.e., values for potential agricultural pro-
ductivity were greater than zero—see below). This means that our
analyses are focussed on areas where agricultural populations can
actually live and we avoid including cells that are not inhabited—
such as desert areas.
Predictor variables. In order to test the different hypotheses
outlined above we used historical and ecological sources of infor-
mation to create the following predictor variables: (i) Distance
from the Eurasian steppe (as a proxy for the intensity of warfare),
(ii) time since development of agriculture, (iii) potential agri-
cultural productivity, (iv) terrain ruggedness, (iv) distance from the
first empires present at 1500 BCE. To assess whether our results are
due to assumptions made in the construction of predictor variables
we created two versions of the distance-from-steppe variable (a
more inclusive classification (Distance from Steppe (Max)), and a
more restrictive (Distance from Steppe (Min)), and three versions
of the duration-of-agriculture variable. This enables us to assess
whether our results are robust to the kind of uncertainty that is
present when conducting these kinds of analyses.
i. Distance from the Eurasian steppe: The steppe region was
defined according to the World Wide Fund for Nature
terrestrial ecoregions of the world map. We explore the
effects of different assumptions about what should be
classified as the Steppe. One assumption has Steppe areas
extending into the levant region of the middle east, and into
Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia (maximal extent—distance from
the Steppe (Max)), while the other stops in the Caucasus,
and does not extend into Kyrgyzstan (minimal extent—
distance from the Steppe (Min))(Table 1 and SI). Great-
Circle distances from the Steppe were calculated in R using
the package geosphere (Hijmans, 2019).
ii. Duration of agriculture: An estimate of the time since
agriculture was practiced in various parts of the world was
taken from a variety of sources reflecting the latest
archaeological information (see SI for definitions and
literature). For testing this hypothesis we are primarily
concerned with evidence about when societies began to
cultivate food as a major part of their diet (see SI).
Uncertainty in these dates was incorporated by specifying
minimum and maximum dates and creating two additional
maps. We calculated the average duration of agriculture for
each cell from these maps therefore creating three variables: a
“best” estimate, and “minimum”, and “maximum” estimates).
iii. Potential agricultural productivity: The agricultural produc-
tivity hypothesis reflects the natural endowment of conditions
conducive to productive agriculture (e.g., climate, available
crops, soil) rather than achieved agricultural production that
may rely on technological or cultural innovations that raise
productivity (cf. Currie et al. (2015)). Data on estimated
potential crop productivities were taken from the Food and
Agriculture Organisation of the UN’s Global Agro-Ecological
Zones (FAO GAEZ) methodology v.3 (FAO, 2012). Different
crop types were used in different regions to reflect the kinds
of crops that were grown historically. We make the
simplifying assumption that overall potential agricultural
productivity can be reasonably proxied by the maximum
potential yield from the main carbohydrate staple crop.
Climatic effects were based on the baseline average climatic
conditions from 1961 to 1990. See discussion and SI for
evaluation of these assumptions with respect to this paper.
iv. Elevation: Elevation data were taken from the GTOPO30
digital elevation model of the world (USGS)(resolution: 30
arc-seconds)(USGS, 1993). The measure of the unevenness
of terrain was calculated as the standard deviation of
altitude across each grid cell.
v. Distance from first empires: The first empires are defined as
those regions that had empires >100,000 km2 at 1500 BC.
Great-Circle distances from the first empires were calcu-
lated in R using the package geosphere (Hijmans, 2019).
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Statistical analyses. Analyses were conducted in R version 3.6.3
(R Core Team, 2015). Simple Pearson and Spearman correlational
analyses were carried out using the base package in R. To sys-
tematically test between the hypotheses, we conducted statistical
analyses using a generalised least squares (GLS) framework, which
allows incorporation of the spatial structure and autocorrelations
contained in the data (see Supplementary Information). The main
spatially explicit GLS analyses were carried out using a modified
version of the nlme (non-linear mixed-effects) package (Pinheiro
et al., 2015), using longitude and latitude as random control
variables (following Pinheiro and Bates (2009) but with distances
calculated based on great-circle distances (see SI)). Including the
spatial structure of the data in nlme using GLS is extremely
memory intensive. We therefore ran analyses over a number of
random sub-samples of the data each involving 1000 cells in order
to ensure that results were not dependent on any particular sample
(see below). All dependent and predictor variables were scaled in
order to produce standardised parameter estimates.
Testing alternative models and model selection. In order to test
between the alternative hypotheses we specified different statis-
tical models containing different predictors of imperial density.
We ran models containing the predictor variables of duration of
agriculture, productivity of agriculture, terrain ruggedness, and
distance from the steppe as main effects. We also assessed to what
extent model fit and parameter estimates were affected by
including distance from first empires as a variable in these
models. We also assessed the impact of including an interaction
term involving the duration of agriculture and distance from the
Steppe variables. We compared models in a model selection
framework (Burnham and Anderson, 2002) based on Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC) (Akaike, 1974). Each model was run
on 20 random samples of 1000 cells to assess variation in the
parameter estimates. As likelihoods are not directly comparable
across samples we used change in AIC (ΔAIC) to guide model
comparability across samples (see SI results).
Model parameters over time. In order to assess if there were any
changes in the strength of our different main factors as pre-
dictors of imperial density over time we ran analyses over a
sliding time-frame of 1000 years. In other words we first analyse
a model with all the predictors of imperial density for the
period 1500 BCE–600 BCE, we then move on to analyse the
period 1400 BCE–500 CE etc. until the final period of 600
AD–1500 AD. Within these time frames we remove any cells to
which agriculture had not spread by the end of that time period.
To assess the effect of distance from first empires we ran these
models again including this variable. Each model was run on 10
random samples of 700 cells to assess variation in the parameter
estimates.
We also ran several confirmatory analyses to assess the effect of
uncertainty in our measures, and to confirm the robustness of the
GLS methods we have used. We also ran exploratory analyses
assessing whether ecological or cultural similarity may have
shaped the occurrence of empires. Details are provided in the SI.
Results
Correlational analyses and main empirical patterns. Correla-
tional analyses and visualisation of the distributions of the data
indicate that distance from the steppe, duration of agriculture,
and distance from first empire all show patterns in line with the
predictions of the relevant hypotheses (Table 1 and Supplemen-
tary Fig S3). However, potential agricultural productivity does not
appear to predict imperial density well; estimated productivity is
high in many places where empires did not tend to form for
example. Ruggedness of terrain also does not show a strong
relationship with imperial density and indicates slightly higher
imperial density in more rugged areas (which is in the opposite
direction to that predicted). These analyses also reveal substantial
correlations between the main predictor variables. This highlights
the need to assess these hypotheses within the same model rather
than examining them purely independently.
Spatially explicit GLS analyses. Comparing the fits of different
models (Table 2) involving different combinations of the main
predictor variables and ruggedness of terrain shows that the best-
fitting models include the variables duration of agriculture,
potential agricultural productivity, terrain ruggedness, and dis-
tance from the steppe. The interaction between duration of agri-
culture and distance from the steppe is also included in the best-
supported models. The standardised parameter estimates (β)
indicate the strength of the association between our predictor
variables and imperial density. The results (Table 2) indicate that
Table 1 Correlation matrix of imperial density and the predictor variables tested in this paper (lower left: Pearson correlation























0.57 0.61 0.54 0.01 0.71 0.72 0.57 0.22
Duration of
agriculture (best)
0.64 0.99 0.99 −0.08 0.43 0.43 0.54 0.13
Duration of
agriculture (min)
0.68 0.99 0.98 −0.08 0.48 0.47 0.55 0.15
Duration of
agriculture (max)
0.61 0.99 0.97 −0.06 0.39 0.39 0.52 0.12
Agricultural
productivity
0.01 −0.07 −0.06 −0.06 −0.11 −0.07 −0.15 −0.12
Distance from
steppe (max)
0.63 0.46 0.51 0.42 −0.09 0.96 0.72 0.14
Distance from
steppe (min)
0.62 0.47 0.51 0.43 −0.07 0.97 0.64 0.13
Distance from
first empires
0.59 0.51 0.52 0.48 −0.12 0.77 0.67 0.20
Elevation 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.14 −0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16
Different measures of duration of agriculture and distance for the Steppe are given to capture the uncertainty in these variables. Imperial density is generally greater closer to the steppe and with
increasing duration of agriculture. There is not a strong relationship between imperial density and potential productivity. There is a strong relationship between imperial density and the control variable of
distance from first empires, but the relationship with elevation (terrain ruggedness) is fairly weak and in the opposite direction to that predicted. There are also substantial-positive relationship between
the measures of duration of agriculture, the measures of distance from the steppe, and the distance from first empires.
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duration of agriculture and distance from the steppe are the
strongest predictors of imperial density, with the interaction term
also being important. The parameter estimates for ruggedness
and productivity are indistinguishable from zero. Overall, the
best-fitting model explains 58% of the variation in imperial
density in this dataset (calculated as pseudo-R2 value where
imperial density is regressed on the predicted values from the
GLS model). Including distance from first empires as a control
variable (see SI results) increases the AIC scores of the best
models and this variable has the largest standardised parameter
estimate (β= 0.34). The variables duration of agriculture
(β= 0.21) and the interaction term (β= 0.13) show very small
decreases in their parameter estimates, while distance from the
steppe is more heavily affected (β= 0.16), but still remains sub-
stantial. Figure 1 compares the original imperial density data with
the distribution predicted by the full GLS model.
Table 2 GLS spatial models with different predictor variables ranked according to how well they fit the data based on mean ΔAIC
values from across the 20 sub-samples of data.










1 −0.15 (0.01) 0.24 (0.04) 0.47 (0.02) 0.15 (0.02) 0.23
2 −0.15 (0.01) 0.24 (0.04) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.46 (0.02) 0.15 (0.02) 1.85
3 −0.09 (0.01) 0.32 (0.04) 0.38 (0.02) 6.56
4 −0.09 (0.01) 0.32 (0.04) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.38 (0.02) 8.10
5 −0.19 (0.02) 0.37 (0.05) 26.08
6 −0.13 (0.02) 0.49 (0.02) 33.76
7 −0.28 (0.02) 58.78
8 −0.28 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 59.22
9 −0.28 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 59.85
Standardised coefficients (β) are presented to indicate the relative strength of each predictor. The best-fitting model contains duration of agriculture and distance from the steppe, and the interaction
between these two variables. Only one other model falls within 2 mean AIC units of the best-fitting model and this also includes small effects of agricultural productivity and elevation.
Fig. 1 Assessment of spatially explicit statistical models. Distribution of imperial density (upper left) compared to distribution predicted by the spatial
GLS model (upper right)(values are divided into into quantiles). Comparison of observed imperial density and predicted values from GLS model (bottom
left). The residuals (lower right) from this relationship indicate where the model predicts the real data reasonably well (light green), or where it over-
(orange, red) or under-(light blue, blue) estimates the observed imperial density (category cut points are based on standard deviations—1 s.d.= 5.7). The
GLS estimates are based on the model ranked 2 in Table 2 as it contains all the tested parameters.
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Model parameters over time. We also assessed whether the
predictive strength of different factors varies through time.
Figure 2 shows how well the variables predict imperial density
over a sliding 1000-year window. In all analyses the distance from
the steppe shows a substantial uptick towards the end of the time
period considered. This could reflect the increasing intensity of
warfare as time went on and the incursions into Europe by groups
such as the Mongols. It is also important to note that this may
also be due to the spread of European large state societies into
Eastern Europe up to the steppe and the Ural mountains during
these later periods. Duration of agriculture is a good predictor of
imperial density and shows a slight increase in predictive strength
before slightly decreasing. This reflects the fact that initially the
spread of empires broadly follows the routes taken in the previous
spread of agriculture, but then in later periods discrepancies begin
to emerge (see Supplementary Discussion). Interestingly, the
interaction term between duration of agriculture and distance
from steppe decreases steadily over time. The potential pro-
ductivity of agriculture and elevation are poor predictors through
all time periods. Further analyses (see SI Results) reveal that the
effect of distance from the first empire declines steadily over time.
This suggests that in early time periods the location of these early
empires may have been an important factor increasing the
probability of large-scale societies inhabiting surrounding areas.
However, this did not have a strong deterministic effect on the
development of such societies as time went on and other his-
torical or ecological processes increased in importance.
Discussion
In this paper, we have tested a number of influential hypotheses
about the evolution of the large, complex human societies.
Overall, the results show strongest support for the duration of
agriculture hypothesis and the steppe warfare intensity hypoth-
esis. These two ideas are complementary and we find support for
an interaction between our measures of duration of agriculture
and intensity of warfare, indicating that selection for large-scale
societies has had more chance to act when the required variation
in norms and institutions has been generated. Importantly these
effects remain important even when distance from first empires is
introduced as a control variable. The fact that the distance from
first empires variables is generated partly from the same data as
the imperial density variable makes this quite a conservative test
of the other hypotheses. This suggests duration of agriculture and
intensity of warfare really are explaining variation that would not
be predicted if the patterns we see simply are due to the his-
torically contingent locations of the initial areas of high social
complexity. It is also not surprising that the importance of dis-
tance from the steppe is more strongly affected by the inclusion of
distance from first empires as both hypotheses involve similar
processes (intensity of warfare, and diffusion of innovations). The
fact that duration of agriculture and the interaction effect are less
affected also lends support to the idea that general processes other
than historical contingency have been important. The study is
also revealing in indicating the hypotheses that are poor expla-
nations of the data. Both the productivity endowment hypothesis
and the terrain ruggedness hypothesis are not supported by our
analyses.
Our confidence in these results is supported by the fact that
different measures of the variables of interest produce broadly
similar results (see Table 1 and Supplementary Analyses). The
causal interpretation of our analyses is also supported by the fact
that the variables chosen are exogenous in that their variation is
not dependent on or shaped by the presence of complex societies.
Agriculture was first practiced in societies at a scale much smaller
than those that are the focus of our analyses in this paper, and in
this dataset agriculture was generally present in regions before
large-scale societies are recorded as being present (only in the last
few time slices do large societies and agriculture spread together
in a small area of eastern Europe). We have used distance from
the steppe as a proxy for warfare intensity rather than actual
measures of warfare intensity partly because warfare may itself be
a function of social scale and related increases in warfare tech-
nology. Similarly focusing on potential agricultural productivity
(rather than actual or achieved productivity) avoids the problem
that larger societies may develop more intense forms of agri-
culture (see below).
Our results indicate the importance of ecology and geography
in shaping the evolution of complex societies. The hypotheses
relating to the two best predictors both involve the emergence of
certain practices that were more likely to occur in certain places
rather than others (i.e., the domestication of crops in suitable
environments, and the domestication of horses and use in warfare
in the Eurasian steppe). These practices then subsequently spread
geographically either through population movements or adoption
by neighbouring groups. As the lack of support for the pro-
ductivity endowment hypothesis also suggests, these results do
not point to a strong form of environmental determinism (in
which external environmental factors dictate that human history
would unfold unerringly in a certain way)(Painter and Jeffrey,
2009) but rather stress the importance of the ways in which
humans interact and shape their social and natural environments.
More generally it is important to note the probabilistic nature
of the ideas we are testing. Even though we have shown that some
variables are good predictors of imperial density it is not the case
that regions that experienced increased warfare, or places with
long histories of agriculture will necessarily develop large, stable
polities. Our best-fitting statistical model explains more than half
the observed variation in imperial density yet this leaves a sub-
stantial proportion of variation unexplained. Some of this may be
due to measurement error and the necessarily coarse grain nature
of our proxy variables. However, it is also indicates that factors
and processes other than those examined in this study may also
be important in determining the geographic and temporal dis-
tribution of larger-scale societies. Some insight into factors that
could be assessed in future analyses comes from examining the
residuals of our best-fitting model (Fig. 1). It can be seen that our
Fig. 2 Variation in predictive strength of variables from the best-fitting
model over the sampled period. Graphs show the standardised parameter
estimates of variables (+/− SD) as predictors of imperial density over the
1000 years prior to the date indicated (negative years relate to years BCE).
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0516-2
6 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2020) 7:34 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0516-2
model over-predicts the occurrence of large-scale societies in
parts of eastern Africa south of the Sahara, some pockets within
the Sahara and Arabian desert zones, and eastern Europe. On the
other hand, imperial density in areas of China, southeast Asia,
and Iran is under-predicted. More fine-grained or better measures
of the factors we have addressed in this paper (e.g., other proxies
that capture increases in the strength of competition between
group, or more localised data on the adoption and importance of
crop-based agriculture), may help reduce some of these dis-
crepancies. But is also possible that other factors are important
too such as the nature and distribution of resources and the ease
with which they can be controlled (Carneiro, 1970; Mattison
et al., 2016; Summers, 2005), or the degree of connectivity
between societies such as in the form of trade (which may enable
institutions to spread more easily, or may provide access to
resources that are important in creating and stabilising large-scale
societies).
This discussion highlights the fact that for selection to act and
drive the evolution of larger societies cultural traits and innova-
tions need to persist and be inherited from one generation to the
next. The ability of cultural traits to be transmitted between
societies also means that societies may not have to develop
solutions to collective action problems independently but can
borrow such innovations from other societies. Traits may be more
likely to be transmitted between societies that are similar ecolo-
gically and culturally. Furthermore, just as biological species can
disperse most easily into regions to which they are genetically or
behaviourally pre-adapted (Wiens and John, 2011), human
groups may find it easier to spread and expand their control over
regions that are similar ecologically or culturally as the institu-
tions they possess are suited to such conditions. These kind of
ecological or cultural barriers may be another potential expla-
nation of variation in the occurrence of large-scale societies. This
may explain the seemingly slower spread of large-scale societies
into sub-Saharan Africa for example. More generally, it has been
argued that as Eurasia extends predominantly along lines of
latitude, where ecological conditions are more similar, the traits
involved in creating large-scale societies and the societies them-
selves could spread more easily here as compared to elsewhere
(Diamond, 1997; Turchin et al., 2006). It has also been proposed
that new institutions may also be more effective when they are
adopted by or imposed on societies that share a common cultural
history, and therefore possess more similar cultural traits and
institutions (Currie et al., 2010; Currie et al., 2016; Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2013). In supplementary analyses (see SI) we have
conducted some initial exploratory tests of these ideas, but we do
find support for the predictions of these generalised hypotheses.
However, further tests are required before we can be confident
about rejecting such processes as important in shaping the dis-
tribution of large-scale societies.
Our study has focused on the region of Eurasia and Africa
during a certain historical time-span so another thing to consider
is to what extent the processes identified in this study have also
been important in the Americas and in later time periods. Horse-
based warfare was not present in the Americas during the time-
frame considered in this study, and reduced in importance in
Afro-Eurasia after 1500 CE due to the subsequent development of
firearms, and increasing importance of naval warfare in Eurasia.
In these cases if we want to test selection-based hypotheses it will
be important to identify other variables that may be better proxies
for these systems. It also worth noting that regions where some
large-scale states such as the Incas and Aztecs did emerge are also
known to be important early centres of plant domestication
(Larson et al., 2014). Therefore, the duration of agriculture of
hypothesis may also be relevant in this part of the world. Such
tests would provide “natural experiments” in which to assess the
generality of these ideas.
Although we find no support for the agricultural endowment
hypothesis, it should be noted that our analyses do incorporate the
assumption that some non-zero degree of agricultural productivity
is essential. What are our analyses indicate, however, is that beyond
this baseline, regions that had the potential to be more productive
are no more likely to have been occupied by large-scale societies
than regions of lower productive potential. It is important to note,
achieved, rather than potential, agricultural production is likely to
be an important factor in that it supports and enables complex
societies to function. Achieved production is a function not just of
ecological endowment but also the technologies that societies
develop, which may be developed in response to increasing popu-
lation pressure and may be facilitated by more complex forms of
organisation. In the future, comparative time series data on chan-
ging agricultural practices and technologies may enable us to fur-
ther assess the relationship between agricultural productivity and
the evolution of complex societies (Currie et al., 2015), taking into
account the potential reciprocal causal pathways involving these
factors and changes in productivity over time due to historical
climate change (see Supplementary Discussion).
In contrast to this study, much previous historically informed
research has focused on the particular cultural traits, social fea-
tures or even individual characteristics of leaders that may have
led to the success of certain societies over others (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2012; McAdam et al., 2001). Here, our focus is on
hypotheses that make tractable predictions about geographic
patterns of variation, yet other explanations for the origin and
maintenance of complex societies are also possible (see Supple-
mentary Discussion). For example, understanding why complex
societies exhibit high degrees of inequality, with elites in some
societies potentially benefitting more than the masses from such
forms of organisation, while other societies have developed more
inclusive forms of institutions (Diehl, 2000). Future work will
examine the different costs and benefits for individuals within
societies and the changing levels of inequality over human history
and the social and ecological conditions under which this occurs.
More generally the study also highlights the importance of
setting out and testing alternative hypotheses about human cul-
tural evolution. The kind of cultural evolutionary approach taken
in this paper enables us to integrate insights and findings from
different disciplines and to develop hypotheses with a clear
understanding about how those ideas might fit together. This
provides a framework to understand whether hypotheses are
competing or complementary, and allows us to quantitatively
assess how well they explain the data and whether some ideas can
be rejected. In doing so we can develop a better understanding of
the historical and ecological processes that have shaped the world
of large-complex societies that we live in today.
Data availability
Data, R code and sources used in these analyses are openly available
at Harvard Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8TP2S7.
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